Crimean press regularly publishes the results of various sociological studies, which are supposed to show that local population is disappointed, by the results of Ukraine’s independent development. One can understand the spite of the traditionally pro-Russian Crimean newspapers on this issue. But it is not clear why the Crimean sociologists have not yet paid attention to the question which is so topical for the region – the attitude of Crimea’s residents to the autonomy, and their opinions on the substance of this phenomena. Currently, one can subjectively hypothesize that if the referendum on the autonomy was held today, the absolute majority of the Crimeans would vote differently from how they in the turbulent January 1991. However, this is only an opinion of a journalist. Meanwhile, by efforts of the Crimean speaker Leonid Hrach, today this anniversary is supposed to become virtually the main state holiday on the peninsula. But is there anything to celebrate? Does Crimean autonomy fulfill its task, being as peculiar phenomenon in unitary Ukraine? Judging from the moods of regular Crimeans, most of them are disillusioned in the independence of Ukraine, in the Crimean autonomy, as well as in once powerful “Russian idea”. The level of political indifference of Crimea’s residents is revealed by the extremely low participation in once politically vivacious Simferopol during August (2000 – Ed.) by-election to the Crimean parliament. At that time sociologists explained the apathy pointing to the Simferopol residents’ disappointment with the confrontation between political groups of L. Hrach and S. Kunitsyn. However, I would argue that Crimeans got tired from being constantly reminded about a “special status” of Crimea by some of the local power holders. In general, an average Russian-speaking resident of Simferopol, unless he is a high-ranking official of one of the republican institutions, has not benefited in any way from the transformation of the Crimean oblast into the Crimean ARSR, and latter into the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Have the power holders benefited? As far as the officials of numerous republican institutions are concerned, “ministry official”, “member of government”, or “member of parliament” indeed sounds better than “head of a department of regional executive committee” or “member of regional council.” Although they say that salaries have remained the same, and the number of staff is only marginally bigger. These are all of the benefits. The number of problems, however, increase every year. The main problem is unstable political situation. Since Crimea is periodically shaken by a storm, Kyiv “has to” pay more and more attention to the troublesome region. The region’s leaders regularly ask either for money or for political support. Events of recent years — confrontation with Kyiv, local parliamentary and governmental crisis, aggravation of the Crimean Tatar problem — have put political elites of the autonomy into complete dependence on the Administration of Ukrainian President. This has allowed Kyiv to take Crimean affairs in hand. Simferopol adopts the most important political, administrative and economical decisions Simferopol only after asking permission in Kyiv, or with an eye on the Pechersk hills. Kyiv has an “iron argument” in this case: Crimea is a “special” region, and it must be “especially” calm. As currently at the Crimean political Olympus it is not fashionable to be indignant at Kyiv’s actions, in its depths a rebellious and naive idea is ripening that “uncle Kyiv’s” may pay less attention to Crimea if the peninsula’s status is downgraded back to that of a region. Another argument in favor of this idea is a possible change of the demographic situation on the peninsula. Current Crimean political elites were formed in the Soviet period, and, with small exceptions, is still guided by the soviet mentality and world views. In this mindset, the integration of the Crimean Tatars into the elite is regarded as a serious threat to the very foundation of power system in Crimea. In different forms, Tatarophobia is widespread among the Crimean bureaucracy. A fear of competition certainly plays a significant role here. All this together draws a “horrible” future prospect when the current territorial autonomy is reorganized into a Crimean Tatar national autonomy. How realistic is this prospect? I will not detail all reasons, but knowing demographic tendencies in Crimea, the preferences of Kyiv and Simferopol leadership, resentment of the majority of the Crimean population against sharing anything with the repatriates, and the views on this subject of our strategic partner to the north-east, one can argue with great certainty that the realization of the idea of Crimean Tatar autonomy is unlikely for the next 50 years at the very least. At the same time, one will be able to speculate on this issue as much as one wants, to frighten socially and economically-deprived Crimean electorate. What about the Crimean Tatars who were the first raise the question of restoring Crimean autonomy? In fact, when activists National Movement were speaking about the “restoration of Lenin’s principles in nationality policy” in the Soviet period, they meant anything but the “territorial” (which in reality is a nomenclature-Russian) principle. In 1991, when the all-Crimean referendum was held, just over 100,000 Crimean Tatars returned to the motherland. Therefore, it is understandable why the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement boycotted this “act of expressing popular will.” Mustafa Dzhemilev said at that time: “This is not our autonomy and not our referendum”. Time made it clear that that the authorities of the autonomy failed (because they didn’t really want) to adequately integrate the Crimean Tatars into the Crimean society or organs of state power. Annual report of the Crimean Center of Independent Researchers and Journalists for the year 2000 says: “the situation elevated the problem to a new level, when a lack of any concrete decisions on the part of government organs leads to increased threat not only to the socioeconomic, but also to the political stability of the state as a whole. The following facts testify to this: Socioeconomic situation and civil status of the repatriates remain extremely unsatisfactory.
Naturally, such catastrophic situation forces people to participate in extreme measures of protest. Among recent examples are mass demonstrations of Crimean Tatars held in February and March 1998 in Simferopol which grew into spontaneous fights and clashes with militia, meetings and disturbances in Simferopol (May 1999), Bakhchisaray (November-December 1999), Feodosia (December 1999), Dzhankoy, Nyzhniohirsk (June-July 2000), Simferopol, Dzhankoi, Bakhchisarai, Nyzhniohirsk (December 2000)”. Analysis of present situation allows to suggest that there are two ways for Crimea: a way that would lead to smooth and painless restoration of the status of a region, or the recognition of the Crimean Tatar factor and the Crimean autonomy gradually developing features of the Crimean Tatar national autonomy. Both variants would be positively accepted by the Ukrainian society. A decade of vagueness, anxiety and confrontation that the resident of Crimea have experienced would help the majority of them to accept possible change of in the status of Crimea with understanding. |
