A big thing can be seen from a distance... It is unlikely that this popular common truth is appropriate for making notes on the decade since the Crimean referendum. However, “the fathers” of this abortive child of the period of perestroika’s decline try today to present their work as an outstanding even of modern Crimean history. The reality now existing in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is a silent reproach to these pretenders to recognition, fanfare and drum rolls. I distinctly remember that Simferopol evening, on the eve of the Crimean referendum. The freezing wind had torn posters and scraps of leaflets off the walls and had driven them along dark and deserted streets, of what was soon to become the capital of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. For some months duration these posters and leaflets had called busily for the inhabitants of the peninsula to vote for ‘the restoration of Crimean statehood’. At that time, in early 1991, which was to become an important year for the USSR, nothing had been destroyed yet, but they already were emphatically proposing to us a ‘restoration’. Those, who proposed this, were the Communists of the Crimean Regional Committee of thee Communist party of Ukraine, who have since then hided in their headquarters, and they obviously understood that only an immediate ‘restoration’ of the Autonomous Republic in Crimea, in case of the collapse of the USSR, would save the nomenclature from the inevitable break-up and chaos. The well-informed party apparatchiks already had no doubts that this would happen. To guide people in the desired direction, chosen by the ‘servants’ a priori. Should deceive this people. The axiom of the Communist party history, unfortunately, shows not only the methods of the Bolsheviks’s policy, but also the quality of that human material as well, which the Bolsheviks ‘worked’ over. “Ah, it is not difficult to deceive me, but I am glad to be deceived!”. These lines of a great poet are fully appropriate to understanding the Crimean’s morale in January 1991. And now, one thinks with surprise, why, and on what basis, the inhabitants of thee emaciated half-island region, which was in no way distinguished from other emaciated regions of Ukraine, suddenly could seriously believe in a certain uniqueness.. And the extent of their acceptance of their uniqueness increased as they raised their voices on the necessity of raising Crimea to the status of a ‘state’. In the Crimean’s deceived consciousness this hazy wording, which was created in the cabinets of the same regional committee, had quite an appreciable resemblance to a proud Crimean variant of the satire of Ilfi and Petrov. How did the crafty leaders deceive the credulous inhabitants of the peninsula? It is paradoxical, but a fact - the party bosses of the 90's used for this purpose those very historical acts of their predecessors, that had always raised a hidden but provable ambiguity or even aversion in society. The first of these is certainly Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic minorities from Crimea under the pretext of their mass betrayal during war. The Communist principle of the collective responsibility, that Communists liked ever since Ilyich’s period and that resulted in open genocide, was denounced during the period ‘of publicity and democratization’. Deportees received an opportunity to return home. This frightened the Crimean Communists hierarchy and they tried, in every possible way, to intimidate the society. Offering ‘quickly’ to create a territorial autonomy, the Crimean authorities aspired (among other things) as though to preempt the Crimean Tatars by connecting their return with the restoration of national territorial autonomy. This was made clear to the common citizens by playing on a fear of “Turkicization” and attracted that part of the population, which was traditionally susceptible to xenophobia and the display of great-power chauvinism. The second subterfuge in this ‘program’ was the odious Khrushchev’s decree of 1954 on the transfer of the Crimean oblast from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This, was would one say today, was a geopolitical fate accompli of Nikita Sergeevich and was always unpopular among the people. They nevertheless were silent. But the time had come, and the ideological successors of the corn leader started to wink at the Crimeans. They said, vote for an autonomy, and then in a twinkling of an eye we shall jump back into Russia - the mother of the whole peninsula. Another decree, also already Stalin’s, in 1945 abolished the Crimean ASSR within the composition of the RSFSR. From this source came the word ‘to restore’ as it went down in history That political entourage was good for that period. The process of creation of a new union Treaty went at full speed, but this product of the undivided love of Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet Republics was never put into practice. In that period to lessen a confrontation within the Russian national regions, Gorbachev had promised that autonomous formations would become the subjects of the new Treaty. On that basis, members of the Regional Organizing Committee on Development of proposals on a status for Crimea also played (there was also such a committee!). In that period, the second secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party, Leonid Hrach, headed this committee. They formulated a crafty question on a referendum offering to the citizens to express their attitude towards a reconstruction of thee Crimean Independent Soviet Socialist Republic as an entity of the union Treaty. Depending on their political knowledge, every Crimean could understand this question in his own way. Some thought, that they supported the creation of a new state, others - n allied republic, and a third hoped that thus the Crimea would return into Russia’s bosom. And only a few had guessed that when giving a positive answer in the referendum they would help the nomenclature to build administrative obstacles in the face of future political storms. Among those, as the Mass Medial informed in that period, was the Organization of Crimean Tatar National movement (OKND), RUKH, the Ukrainian Republican party (URP). The National Front of Crimea, the Club of the voters and some others. The Chairman of the Regional Soviet first secretary of the Regional Communist party committee, Mikola Bagrov, informed a session of the Regional Council about the results of the referendum that was held on January 20, 1991, and gave the following figures: 1,770,841 persons were included in the voting lists, of these 1,443,260 received bulletins; of these 1,441,019 or 81.37 percent took part in the voting. And of these 1343855 men or 93.26 percent voted ‘for’. While 81254 men or 5,64 percent voted ‘against.’ Crimean Tatars were living then in the peninsula, but in most cases they had no residence permit, and those who still lived then in Central Asia, also did not receive a right to take part in the referendum. Moreover, at the call of the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKND) practically all Crimean Tatars, who had returned to their Motherland, boycotted the referendum. But this has not deterred at all the organizers of ‘the national will’. After ten years, one can say with a complete basis that many dreams of the Crimean nomenclature of the early 90's have come true. All of them now have or have a possibility to have prominent positions as premiers and ministers and even speakers. Which means at the same time, the appropriate perks of officials, including cars, flats, security and the prospect to receive special pensions. It is not important at all, that our parliament isn’t a parliament, because the unprofessional deputies constitute only a backdrop to the group of functionaries who don’t accept any laws. And the Council of Ministers only as exchanged its office signboards and salary. Thus the procedure for occupation of positions of the majority of the cabinets remained the same. There is now an appropriate Constitution and even an Anthem in this operetta republic. All of us are contented” Alas, alas.. Kiev still has not forgotten the desire for independence of Crimea in the period of Meshkov. All separatist wheeze of that period, which was undertaken, obviously, not without interest of the Russian ‘fans’ for the team of the first and last Crimean President, has created in the high cabinets of the capital of Ukraine, a hostile image toward autonomy. They still remember, with what difficult work the discharge of Meshkov himself and the liquidation of the institution of the Crimean presidency required. In Kyiv, some believe not without grounds, that a special independent territorial formation within thee composition of the Unitary state is not only a simple political nonsense, but also a harmful precedent and bad example for imitation by some other traditional freedom-loving regions in the country. An additional source of tension is - the problems of the deported peoples (and first of all, the Crimean Tatar people). Which being still unsettled, create constant tension in the international sphere. It is completely obvious for Kyiv that the Crimean Tatars do not accept autonomy in its present form, and the leadership of the republic is not capable independently to remove the painful processes within the environment of the repatriates. Many times, the last pro-Russian or the present pro-Russian-procommunist leadership of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC frequently provoked the appearance of explosive situation in the peninsula. Thee system of mutual interrelationship of the representative and executive powers in Crimea has also created a huge problem, which was caused by the creation of autonomy. This problem was greatly aggravated with the coming to power of Leonid Hrach in the republic’s parliament. Namely he, who spent some long years in political non-existence and at last received, in his own hands that for which actually the referendum of January 20 was conceived. At the same time, Leonid Hrach, who is the epitome of thee nomenclature class, has realized in his vigorous innovations all their expectations. Hrach didn’t resign himself to never submit that the Council of Ministers of the ARC would act side by side as an independent branch of power. However the Crimean Council of ministers enters into the system of executive power of Ukraine, and those boxes on the ear, which the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea regularly deliver to their ‘own’ government, ricochet to the State as well. At the same time, an elective office of the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC does not allow to Kyiv adequately to answer the uncontrollable shouts of gone to far ‘avotomniks’. And this causes a backlash of the central bodies of government. Parallelism, which is not peculiar to regions, and excessive staffs of administrative personnel, create a fertile ground for corruption and organized criminality in the autonomy. In none of the regions of Ukraine is such growth of criminal activity as large as in Crimea because the first seven or eight years of autonomous existence was not supervised. Only the intervention of thee Kyiv law-enforcement structures has put an end to the independent gangster wave. These years were noted for disappointment and for those Crimeans who hoped that a creation of autonomy would result in economic revival of the peninsula. A level of socio-economic development in Crimea has by no means achieved the best place among a number of other regions of Ukraine. It is quite understandable because a presence of the independent status does not provide at all any privileges or benefits. And the absence of indigenous power resources on the peninsula makes the republic completely dependent on the situation of the fuel and energy complex of the whole country. Resort-recreational sphere of the autonomy, which has lingered over from the development of the level of the 80's is not capable in the competitive struggle with the European industry of tourist and rest and any special status of the peninsula will not involve here investments considering the existing tax legislation in the country and unstable political balance in the region. ...What will be forthcoming in the Crimean decade? It is obvious that the international obligations of Ukraine will not allow the central power under that or other excuses to cancel the independent status of Crimea. At the same time, the general political realities in the state and on the peninsula will prevent attempts to transfer autonomy from a territorial basis to national. Nevertheless changes will come inevitably. We are to become changed ourselves. First ten years of the twenty-first century should, at last, un-accustom us to trust in the myths of the Soviet epoch. Among them and that the happy life can be achieved by way of voting in election or referenda. We will answer to our own needs relying on our own resources of hands minds and souls, and not on the basis of questions posed by others in some bulletin. |
