Mykyta KASYANENKO,
journalist

CRIMEA AND UKRAINE: ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY...

Ten years of Crimean autonomy in Ukraine: observations, political conclusions, prospects...

What did they want to restore and what was restored?

Ten years ago, on January 20, 1991, the first referendum in the history of the USSR was held. In this referendum the following question was posed: “Are you in favour of re-establishing the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a subject of the USSR and a participant in the Union Treaty?” “Yes!” - 93.6% of the respondents answered. It has been suggested that the author of the complicated formula put forward in the referendum document was Leonid Kravchuk, at the time the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] of Ukraine. At present, in spite of Leonid Hrach’s assurances about the immortal historical significance of this referendum, no-one knows how to interpret its results, not only from a moral-social point of view, but even from a legal perspective. The fact is that its result was first of all dictated by the anti-communist and centrifugal moods prevailing at the time in the country. The result easily could have been predicted; in principle there was no great need to hold this referendum. And only the communists, who finally had an opportunity, for the first time in their history, to ask the people what they actually wanted, now consider this referendum their achievement, although its result had been programmed - they didn’t want to risk getting an unexpected answer. Second, on December 1 of the same year, 1991, a majority of Crimeans also voted, in another referendum, in favour of independence for Ukraine. Some politicians consider that from a legal point of view the latter referendum cancelled out the decision of the January 20 referendum on the Union and Union Treaty. In spite of this the communists and pro-Russian organizations in Crimea continue to celebrate the 20th of January as the Day of the Republic of Crimea, and ignore the Day of Independence of Ukraine celebrated in August. Thus the only significant result of that referendum was the estrangement of Crimea from Ukraine, even if one ignores all later attempts to manipulate developments in the peninsula. Confirming this conclusion is the fact that the pro-Russian movement that was later established in Crimea intentionally adopted the name “20th of January”.

The results of the Crimean referendum are ambiguous from another point of view as well. Everyone then understood (although this was partly concealed) that what was being “re-established” was by no means that which was being declared; that is, the status quo which existed in 1944. This is apparent if one simply considers the fact that the autonomy established in 1921 was created (incidentally, without any kind of referendum!) for Crimean Tatars and only with them in mind (36 percent of the parliamentary deputies were Crimean Tatars, their language had the status of a state language, Crimean Tatars had a guaranteed quota in educational establishments, a well-developed native-language educational system, etc.), whereas prior to the beginning of 1991 there were few Crimean Tatars in Crimea and for all practical purposes they did not participate in the referendum. However, what is significant is that the situation continued to develop in a totally unpredictable way. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic first of all was transformed into the so-called “Republic of Crimea”, then into the “autonomous (with a small “a”) Republic of Crimea”¹, and then finally into the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The second (communist) constitution of Crimea reflected the culmination of the territorial structuring of the autonomy. The deported peoples no longer had guaranteed representation in the Crimean parliament, and the Russian and Crimean Tatar languages lost their status as state languages. And now, even in comparison with what was renewed by the above-mentioned referendum, Crimea has undergone a dramatic transformation and, what is more, this transformation occurred without referenda of any kind! Today even the residents of Crimea would not confirm their earlier decision. According to the results of a survey conducted by the sociological service of the “KB-SAM” firm, only 40 percent of those surveyed would answer in the affirmative to the question that was posed 10 years ago, and a significant number would not even participate in such a referendum. It is not surprising that ten years ago the idea of conducting the referendum was, at a popular level, accompanied by jokes that maybe one should try to recreate, on the Crimean peninsula, the Kingdom of Feodoro or possibly the Genoese Italian republic. And only certain specialists in the field of history joked about “recreating” the Crimean khanate...

From the very beginning of the existence of the autonomy there were furious arguments focussing on the significance of the autonomy and the form it should assume. Initially Crimea was called a “suitcase without a handle”. It was difficult for Ukraine to carry this suitcase, but it was a shame to throw it away. Then it was decided that Crimea, in view of Russia’s claims to Sevastopol and attempts to annul the 1954 legislative act that transferred Crimea to Ukraine, was in fact an “apple of discord” although many felt that it was more suited to playing the role of a “bridge of friendship between Ukraine and Russia”. There was talk not only of transferring Crimea back to Russia, and of re-examining the Kuchuk-Kuynardzhiyskiy treaty, but also of a so-called condominium; that is, joint administration of Crimea by Ukraine and Russia. One could also come across the image of Crimea as an “anchor” that Russia would always use to keep Ukraine in its orbit. Of course, it was this latter image that was most true to life...

Thus given what happened following the referendum, it is clear that it was used solely as an excuse for introducing arbitrary administrative changes in Crimea. No-one was serious about the referendum’s decisions, which served a purely decorative function, and no-one plans to account to 93.6 percent of the population for the way in which, ten years later, these decisions are now being implemented. On the contrary, for some unknown reason this referendum has now assumed a certain mythical character and every politician (an example is Leonid Hrach) tries in every possible way to exaggerate his role in conducting the referendum. In the context of this “referendum game” the idea that autonomy for Crimea should signify national autonomy for the Crimean Tatars has turned into a sorry joke played on Crimea’s autochthonous population. The Congress of Russian Communities of Crimea recently circulated, on the internet, the results of a “survey” of Crimean youths intended to assess “how they perceive Crimean Tatars”. It appears that even today Russians are perceived by anonymous “students” as “good, spiritual people” even though they “like to drink”, and are a “strong and wise people”, and “good-looking and straightforward, even if rather lazy”. In contrast, Crimean Tatars are perceived to be “wicked, spiteful and vindictive”, “sly, boorish, cruel and revengeful”, “religious nationalists”, and they are “meddlesome”, “constantly dissatisfied”, “crude, stupid, greedy, and envious”. In short, it is difficult to imagine anything that would do more to exacerbate inter-ethnic relations than this “survey”, which could be held even after ten years of autonomy for Crimea. For all the talk of “bridges”, “suitcases” and “apples” was loudly proclaimed for one simple reason. It diverted attention from the fact that, in addition to everything else Crimea is the homeland of the Crimean Tatars, a people who, in contrast to the others who were deported from Crimea- Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Germans- have no other homeland.

The only ones who always remembered this were the Crimean Tatars themselves. And the more loudly the parable of Crimea as a “bridge” was repeated, the louder the Crimean Tatars repeated their demands for the reinstatement of their rights in their homeland, and the more this enraged the communists who were in positions of authority in Crimea. And parallel to this one found the following: the more one heard it mentioned that Crimea belonged to Ukraine and that Ukrainian influences and the Ukrainian language should become more prominent in Crimea - the more persistently one heard threatening statements about the violation of the rights of Russians, about attempts to restrict the use of the languge of inter-ethnic communication [Russian], and about coercive Ukrainization. Only the anti-Ukrainian and anti-Crimean Tatar aspects of the referendum had a real impact on society. Even Hrach’s new idea that a bridge should be built across the Kerch straits, that is, to Russia, is for some reason very loudly proclaimed as an alternative to, and making impossible the construction of, a bridge to Istambul, although one cannot even begin to imagine such a project. Likewise, the plans to build a bridge to Russia have given rise to the “joke” that if such a bridge is actually built then Crimea could secede from Ukraine by putting up a “Russian” rampart at Perekop. Ten years ago, no-one could even imagine that the year 2001 would be characterized by an unprecedented rise in tensions: that the pro-communist press in Crimea would again print stories about the Turkish threat, Turkish emissaries, and other nonsense that only plays into the hands of Russia and, what is more, is based on primitive stereotypes from the past.

Criticizing the leaders of the Crimean Tatar community, Leonid Hrach, who is chairman of the Crimean institution that represents the authority of the state, portrays them as “enemies of Crimea”. Actually, this is not really all that strange. After all, this is the same party leader who, ten years ago, conducted a referendum with the aim of ensuring that, even in new conditions, everything would remain in his hands. He hoped that he would continue to be in charge of the situation and could prevent historical justice from being restored with regards to the people against whom his party had, in 1944, committed a terrible crime. Thus it is fully appropriate today to argue that in terms of its character and results the 1991 referendum is very closely related to the communist deportation of 1944. In 1944 the Crimean Tatars were deprived of their land and territory by deporting them from Crimea. In 1991 the dying communist regime was no longer capable of preventing the return of the former deportees to their homeland, and it “deported” the territory of Crimea itself from under the feet of the repatriates. They did this by “recreating” in Crimea not a national-cultural autonomy for the Crimean Tatars, and not even a territory that would belong fully to Ukraine and where Ukrainian statehood could be fostered, but a Russian communist autonomy. Ten years later it has become clear that this was a sly stroke of genius! The Meshkov regime only temporarily deprived the communists of control over Crimea, and it is no accident that Hrach alternated between competing and cooperating with Meshkov during the campaign to elect a president for Crimea. Because of the incompetence of Meshkov and his supporters, less than two years later control over Crimea returned to Hrach, and he has maintained this control to the present day. Thus the date of January 20, 1991 did not represent the restoration of historical justice with respect to the deportees that they had expected (otherwise why would they, even today, need to protest and demand the reinstatement of their rights?). Rather it represented a continuation of the 200-year-long historical tradition of hostility on the part of the Russian-Soviet-communist regime with respect to Muslims. Although this will sound paradoxical, in the recent history of the post-Soviet region the Chechen war and January 20, 1991 stand alongside each other.

Crimea’s status automatically became part of the heritage of Ukraine, a country that has no historical experience of dealing with inter-ethnic problems. To a large extent the content of Crimea’s autonomy was a bolt from the blue for Ukraine. Even today the state authorities not only do not understand the essence of the problem; they have not even begun to comprehend its meaning and their historical responsibility. They do not understand the extent of the threat to national security of Crimea’s autonomy and the necessity, sooner or later, to resolve this problem. Many do not even suspect that the status of Crimea in Ukraine, if this problem is not solved (even Leonid Hrach now affirms that “Crimea needs to be politically “demagnitized” although he invests this term with his own specific meaning!) will, in the near future, increasingly influence the status, self-perception, and image of the country as a whole.

Today no-one in Crimea, with the possible exception of Leonid Hrach, is satisfied with the status provided by Crimea’s autonomy. It does not satisfy the Russians since, as political scientist Andriy Mal’hin has noted, “the Crimean elite, it turns out, has been incapable of clearly formulating and effectively defending its interests. In its ten-year-long battle that never had very clear aims, the local political movement lost its mobilizing potential”. In his opinion the Constitution of Ukraine and the legislation regulating Crimea’s autonomy do not solve but simply freeze in place the existing problems, especially the following three. First of all is the question of the extent of regional jurisdiction, which Crimea continuously tries to expand without answering the question- jurisdiction for whom and for what purpose? This question centres on Crimea’s right to have its own independent budget. The second issue is the unity of the territory of the autonomy, for it can be argued that Sevastopol has been torn out of this territory. The third issue is the status of the Russian language. One of the leaders of the Congress of Russian Communities of Crimea, Vadym Mordashov, has stated that the autonomy has resulted in a “political miscarriage”.

The autonomy does not satisfy Ukrainians since, with the exception of the fact that 0.45 percent of students have shifted to studying the Ukrainian language and in spite of accusations that a “coercive Ukrainization” of Crimea is taking place, this autonomy has given them nothing. Even the feeble attempts to strengthen the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language in Crimea are openly identified, by the local Communist Party press, as “linguistic occupation”.

The results of the referendum and Crimea’s incomprehensible “territorial” autonomy also displease the Crimean Tatars. Ten years after the referendum they found themselves thrown out of the parliament of “their” autonomy, and once again they have to fight for the status of their language, for greater educational opportunities in their own language, for the right to receive land, to play a role in the privatization process and even for the right to become citizens of their new Ukrainian homeland.

Businessmen are unhappy with the autonomy, for its separate institutions that adopt various normative-legal acts do not simplify the business climate but, on the contrary, make it more complicated. According to political scientist Oleksandr Formanchuk “Crimea’s autonomy has not fulfilled its promise, although in 1991 it attenuated a conflict-prone situation and we avoided the development of a Transdnistria-type scenario. The current situation represents the full demise of the autonomy in light of the form that it should have assumed...”.

The only ones who are satisfied with the situation are, of course, the bureaucrats, for whom the autonomy created wonderful conditions for multiplying. The Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, Anatoliy Korniychuk, considers that Crimea “always had a special status, even in the USSR”. But now it “has lost its mandate”, which “it should use for the general good... In the meantime it is a fact that present-day Crimea, because of its autonomous status, has gained an entire army of bureaucrats. To support Crimea’s Council of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada the overall figure of 29 million hryvnias [per year!- author] is allocated from Crimea’s budget. This is considerably more than is allocated for similar purposes by any oblast of Crimea’s size. Instead of creating a comfortable environment for themselves these bureaucrats should think more about the population as a whole, should ensure the functioning of the local economy, and should pay pensions and salaries on a regular basis”. But what can one say - even before the referendum some Ukrainian politicians warned specifically about the danger of the proliferation of Crimea’s bureaucrats. And now “we have what we have”!

It is not surprising that in Crimea one ever more frequently hears people saying that this kind of autonomy should be liquidated and Crimea transformed again into an oblast of Ukraine, as was the case prior to 1991. Leonid Hrach calls this a “beggar’s” idea although it is posed by life itself- it is perfectly clear, and confirmed by the present situation, that this is a shaky, unstable autonomy. Whether it wants to or not Ukraine will have to untie the “Crimean knot”, including its political component, in the 21st century. And it is obvious that it is specifically the nature of the autonomy that will have to be addressed, since in its present form it has not guaranteed the rights and fulfilled the hopes of all interested parties found among Crimea’s population. What kind of autonomy, then, should Crimea have in order to eliminate the contradictions, which have accumulated, and become more acute, and are precisely the product of its current status? A “formula for the autonomy of Crimea” does not currently exist, and it is more than obvious that it was not discovered during the 1991 referendum. It is no accident then that certain American political analysts consider that it is too early for Ukraine to boast of Crimea’s stability, that the main problems facing Crimea are still ahead of it, and that they, quite naturally, will be associated with the search for and realization of a new type of autonomy for the peninsula. Today it is clear that resolving such a complex problem proved too great a challenge for both the old communist administration of the Crimean oblast and the new communist regime in the “recreated” autonomy.

The moment of truth and anniversary plagiarism

Anniversaries were loved above all in our once great country. The period between anniversaries was entirely taken up with waiting for and preparing for them. However our anniversaries, as a rule, were not celebrated properly. After all, hadn’t even Lenin stated that the best way of observing anniversaries was to organize work competitions? But instead everyone, under the brave sound of marches, went to participate in parades. What was the logic behind this? There is another point of view, that anniversaries are not an excuse for celebrations, but provide an opportunity to reflect on the events of the past. In a pre-anniversary speech on Crimean television Mykola Bahrov, one of the founders of Crimea’s autonomy and currently the rector of the Tavridian National University (not a pro-Russian, not a pro-Ukrainian, but a pro-Crimean politician, he once stated!) said that “he would like this anniversary to be one of reflection, an anniversary of plans for the future, and if we simply hold an official meeting with a concert then, you must excuse me for saying this - the value of such an effort will, in my opinion, be minimal”. And this is precisely what they did in Crimea - they held an official meeting and a concert... .

Was this tenth anniversary of the autonomy an occasion for reflection and making plans for the future? It was, but not for everyone. It was, for example, for Mykola Bahrov himself. In the government newspaper this scholar, in the recent past a prominent Crimean politician, came up with a profound article, “A Moment of Truth”, in which he drew attention to the autonomy’s successes, failures, and mistakes. He is a former politician because in 1994, in elections for a president of Crimea, the residents of the peninsula took the ready autonomy that had been “created” specifically with Bahrov in mind and, tempted by promises that Ukraine would enter the ruble zone and would become part of Russia, they transferred it to the prodigal hands of the parochial lawyer Meshkov. In Bahrov’s opinion the main purpose of the decade was exemplified not by the referendum of January 20, 1991 itself, but should have consisted of a creative process following the referendum. Crimea did a poor job of utilizing this opportunity, and the authorities were to blame. I’m referring first of all, of course, to the Meshkov and RDK authorities. And then it was the turn of the communist authorities. Mykola Bahrov, who during the past decade wrote several books, became a professor and a doctor of sciences, and the rector of a prominent university, divides the decade into three periods. First: from January 1991 to September 1992, when the autonomy provided the results of the referendum with a legislative foundation- a constitution was adopted, as well as a law specifying the division of responsibilities between the central authorities and the autonomy, and the basis was established for an open economy. Second: from the election of Yuriy Meshkov to the elimination of the presidency- this period saw the liquidation of the constitution, the resubordination of the government of Crimea to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and an increase in tensions in all spheres of the autonomy’s internal affairs. Third: this is the period from the time when Crimea’s special powers were reduced to the present day.

Mykola Bahrov writes that after leaders a la Meshkov disappeared from the political scene, and after victory over the criminal clans, the attitude of Kyiv towards Crimea changed, so that “it changed from being fearfully expectant to being more kind and generous”. This inspired people, and there was a desire to accomplish as much as possible. As a representative of Crimea in Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, Mykola Bahrov held discussions with scholars and deputies concerning the need for a new constitution for Crimea. However, as was the case during the preceding period, Crimea lost its chance to influence Ukraine’s new constitution. In Mykola Bahrov’s words the section on Crimea in this constitution was prepared by legal experts who were good specialists, but they were “indifferent to the needs of the autonomy”. And as soon as serious, well-informed work on the new text of the constitution of Crimea begain, all of a sudden it became clear that... a text had already been prepared! It had been hurriedly prepared by a group under the leadership of Leonid Hrach. Now it became clear to the residents of Crimea why Leonid Hrach and his party comrades so loudly “proclaimed” the virtues of this constitution- so that its real drawbacks would be less visible. In Mykola Bahrov’s opinion it “only partly reflected” what it could have contained if it had not been prepared in such haste. Today, in his opinion, one must again search for “legal mechanisms for improving the state of the autonomy”. But what Mykola Bahrov considers is of the greatest harm to Crimea today is the way in which Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada takes decisions which are in conflict with Ukraine’s legal system, and the conflicts among different branches of government “in which the Verkhovna Rada is by no means always in the right, since it often creates grounds for conflicts where they had not existed previously”. “Why turn for solutions to the Constitutional Court!” the former chairman of Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada asks in surprise. Mykola Bahrov feels that it is probably necessary to pass a new law concerning Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada, as well as a law concerning the government of Crimea. In addition, it might be necessary to return to the issue of a law on the division of powers. In a word, taking advantage of his still unshakeable authority, Mykola Bahrov let it be understood that not only he does not highly assess the work of the present parliamentary speaker Leonid Hrach, but does not even approve of his actions. And Bahrov has already felt the consequences of his words. But more about this later... .

In turn Leonid Hrach (who, by the way, repeated Bahrov’s formula by later referring to himself as not a Russian or Ukrainian nationalist, but a “Crimean nationalist”) announced on several occasions on television that for this anniversary he was preparing a “theoretical article” in which he would outline all the accomplishments of the decade. And he prepared such an article! The article “Crimean autonomy- an answer to the challenge of this period in history” was published on January 18 not only in two newspapers simultaneously, but it was also published as a separate pamphlet, just as Leonid Brezhnev’s “Mala zemlya [Small Land]” had once been published. But the very next day this publication was the subject of great surprise among its readers and various discussions in the mass media. The parliamentary chair’s article not only duplicated the ideas, certain conclusions, and the train of thought of a book written by the director of the Crimean Folklore Museum Andriy Mal’hin, entitled “The Crimean Knot”, in places it reproduces, word by word and without any modifications, entire paragraphs of the text of this book without, of course, any reference to the original. And since the book of this ordinary Crimean historian was published back in September 2000, while the chairman’s article was written and published in January 2001, there are no doubts that Hrach, an honoured jurist, academician and doctor of historical sciences simply cribbed the text of the museum director. Let us call this “anniversary plagiarism”.

However, he did not copy everything, but added something of his own. And his contribution is immediately clear: as in the past Leonid Hrach praises to the sky the leading and directing role of the Communist Party in the rebirth of the autonomy and exaggerates his own role in the process. Confusing historical events and political terminology, he continues to treat the concept of nationalism in the same way that it was treated, in accordance with the “Short Course”, in textbooks on the history of the CPSU, and he tries to prove the correctness of that which has already been convincingly proven false by the actual course of history. The most vituperative expression in Leonid Hrach’s article is “antediluvian anti-communism”. It seems that to this day the author has not realized that anti-communism (as in the case of anti-fascism in the past) now has become the norm in social relations and that, on the contrary, what is “antediluvian” today is precisely the communism that has ensured that such a large country, with its bountiful natural and human resources, has become a backwater of history.

On January 20 a festive meeting was held in a theatre in Crimea, and from the speakers’ speeches one could gauge whether or not there is much to be proud of in Crimea’s autonomy. The head of the government, Serhiy Kunitsyn, stated in his presentation that industrial production is expanding in the autonomy, and that during the short period of the work of today’s government one has seen growth of 12 percent. Overall, however, even today the autonomy produces “only 42 percent of the production of the Crimean oblast”. Leonid Hrach adopted a diametrically different approach in his presentation- he painted in rosy colours the political achievements of the autonomy, praised his constitution, and stated that the referendum “had many fathers but only one mother- the Crimean oblast party organization of the Communist Party”. The criticism aimed at him, which now comes from all directions, he dismissed (you’ll never guess!)- as linked to the “cassette” scandal in Ukraine, and in this way he put himself in the same category as... the country’s president.

And further: Leonid Hrach stated that “the appointment of Andriy Mal’hin as director of the Crimean Republican Folklore Museum, and what he and his colleagues have accomplished in the course of only a few months, have cancelled out all that was negative in the museum’s earlier activity [throughout all the previous years?- author]. This gives me grounds to say today that as a result of his activities Andriy Mal’hin has convinced the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea and me personally, as Chair of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea [ARC], of the need to rethink the parliament’s decision to transfer this building to the Tavridian National University. This building will be left to the museum. This is the result of my serious consideration of this matter. This is also a recognition of my personal mistake. I will personally introduce a proposition during the session concerning a cancellation of the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC on removing the building on 14 Hohol’ St. from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture”. This is how Leonid Ivanovych, as a result of his “serious consideration”, “punished” Mykola Vasyl’ovych [Bahrov] for failing to approve of his actions, and encouraged the author of the book from which he borrowed “his” ideas for an article. And there is nothing strange in this: journalists in Crimea had previously written that the attempt by Leonid Ivanovych, in contravention of the law, to transfer the museum building to the jurisdiction of the university was a form of “payment” by the parliament’s chairman to Mykola Bahrov for his loyalty and indulgent attitude concerning Hrach’s activities. And as soon as this loyalty came to an end... In addition, who knows- maybe suddenly, from another angle, the book’s author will stake a claim to his own thoughts? You can’t let this happen, and you have to act before it’s too late! What a scandal could result!

Otherwise, however, the anniversary passed quietly in Crimea. Only Mykola Hubenko, who was the leader of “People’s Will”, an informal organization in the late 1980s, again pitched a tent on the central square of Simferopol and demanded, as he had ten years earlier, that bureaucrats be held responsible for their corruption. On the very same square approximately 300 individuals from the Russian Community of Crimea held a demonstration and adopted a resolution that stated: “Our unfortunate constitution, which was passed into law although all legislative norms were violated in the process, in no way protects the civil rights of Crimeans and fails to guarantee the economic, political, and cultural interests of the republic. During the last ten years the Crimean authorities have obediently adhered to the “statist” policy of the Ukrainian authorities, who attempted to eviscerate the essence of the autonomy as a territory with a special status, rights and responsibilities...”.

And all this reminds us of the prophetic words that it is easy to declare the existence of a republic, but where will you find the republicans it needs? It would seem that in the course of the last ten years they have failed to appear. Some people cannot go beyond the idea of holding a demonstration, and others a festive meeting. During these ten years the moment of truth has not arrived, and the essence of Crimea’s autonomy to this day remains misunderstood and unrealized. But what is most offensive is that, once again, what was most important was completely ignored- the evaluation by Crimean Tatars of this anniversary. No-one was interested in what they thought of this event, although there was a very good reason to pay attention to their reaction. At the beginning of January, a few days before the anniversary was celebrated, the Crimean Tatar Kurultay was convened. And the main problem that we must understand is that at this very moment an extremely important question is being addressed. What will be the relationship between Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars: will they, in the 21st century, become allies and partners or antagonists and even enemies, just as we find in the case of Russia and its Muslim population?

The Kurultay: An evaluation of ten years of activity in Ukraine...

Reference: “The First Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar people was held on March 25, 1917 in Simferopol, and two thousand delegates took part in its proceedings. It elected a Muslim executive committee headed by the then mufti of Crimea, Numan Chelebidzhikhan, and he was authorized by the Provisional government to decide all matters related to the current and future affairs of the Crimean Tatar people. On December 18, 1917 the Crimean Tatar Kurultay proclaimed itself to be the government of the region - a Directory. It was an ally of the UNR [Ukrains’ka Narodna Respublika - Ukrainian People’s Republic]. On January 22, 1918 it was disbanded by the Crimean oblast Military-Revolutionary Committee, and Numan Chelebidzhikhan was shot, without a trial, in Sevastopol. The Second Kurultay was held on June 26-30, 1991, in Simferopol, and it consisted of 264 delegates elected by Crimean Tatars living throughout the territory of the USSR. It elected a Medzhlis, the and Mustafa Dzhemilev became its chairman. Although the USSR was still in existence the Kurultay approved a Declaration on the National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar people, a statute concerning the national flag and national hymn, and a decree concerning the transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.

Later the following were held: November 24, 1991 - a regional conference of delegates to the Second Kurultay. July 27-31, 1993 - the second session of the Second Kurultay. November 27-29, 1993 - the third (extraordinary) session of the Second Kurultay. June 26-29, 1996 - the first session of the Third Kurultay. December 19-21, 1997 - an extraordinary session of the Third Kurultay. November 21, 1998 - a regional conference of delegates to the Third Kurultay. October 1-3, 1999 - the third session of the Third Kurultay.

January 6-7, 2001 the subsequent, fourth session of the Third Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar people was held in Simferopol. All circumstances now point to the fact that many changes will occur in the future in the Crimean Tatar movement. First of all, the January Kurultay prepared a summary evaluation of the development of the Crimean Tatar people during the last three centuries. That is, this summary covered the period from the moment when the Crimean Tatars lost their statehood in 1783. It included the mid-point of the recently concluded century when the final act of deportation from the homeland occurred, and it concluded with the moment when Allah helped the Crimean Tatars, on the eve of a new millenium, to return to their homeland. And now the question had to be posed- what next? What would characterize the history of the Crimean Tatars during the 21st century: new cataclysms, or a happy turn of circumstances and a future filled with good fortune? Maybe the Crimean Tatars will not call the century in which we find ourselves “a time of genocide and illegality”, as they characterize the two previous centuries?

Second- and this is a paradox that is characteristic of this movement- the Crimean Tatar national movement is today, from one perspective, very highly consolidated and organized, but from another perspective one cannot say that it is at the same time uniform in nature. For example, in the course of the most recent Kurultay Mustafa Dzhemilev responded to criticism in a characteristically sincere but sharp manner and immediately raised the issue of new elections for the head of the Medzhlis on an alternative basis. However, only one delegate voted in support of placing this question on the agenda. On the other hand, apart from the Kurultay and Medzhlis, several other political organizations are active: the rather small NDKT movement, supported by the communists and pro-Russian organizations, the “Millet” [Nation] group, and also the Council of Aksakals [Elders] attached to the office of the Chairman of the Crimean Verkhovna Rada. The latter council sometimes sharply criticizes the actions of the Medzhlis. But it is rather odd that in spite of the actual diversity of these currents in the Crimean Tatar movement, they nonetheless convey a firm impression of ideological unity since they are as one when it comes to the main issue - the full repatriation of the Crimean Tatars and the recreation of the autonomy in, at the very least, the form it had assumed in 1921. A diversity of views is only found once this basic premise has been accepted.

Third, in spite of all the successes of the Kurultay and Medzhlis, which include the election of two of its representatives to Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, participation in the elaboration of legislation, and the creation of the President’s Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar people (it includes the entire membership of the Medzhlis, and no-one else), this could not protect the Crimean Tatars from the reality that its current situation, as was noted at the Kurultay, even if it has not worsened, has not seen any significant changes for the better...

Fourth, the Crimean Tatar national movement is welcoming the new century in a situation of increasing contradictions within Crimean society as a whole, contradictions that of course have nothing to do with a pro-Tatar policy on the part of the current communist leadership of Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada. And this results in an exacerbation of contradictions in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. What is quite characteristic of the current situation is that the communist party in Crimea accuses the “national radicals from the Medzhlis” of all kinds of sins and predicts that “events in Chechnya could turn out to be child’s play when compared to what could catch fire in Crimea and the vicinity...”.

Fifth, the Kurultay has adopted a resolution concerning the election of a new Kurultay which is to be convened already in the summer of the present year. And although it will be based on a two-step electoral mechanism (first of all Crimean Tatars will elect their representatives, who will then directly elect delegates to the Kurultay, which is explained by the difficulty of holding direct elections as long as Crimean Tatars are dispersed throughout several countries) it is almost a certainty that the composition of the new Kurultay will differ somewhat from the composition of its predecessor. However, in view of the current situation in which many problems of the Crimean Tatar people remain unsolved (in particular, its status in Ukraine, its participation in administrative bodies, and the state of its language and culture), at this point no-one can with any certainty state that the new Kurultay will be more moderate or more radical. In all likelihood it will be the latter. And then Ukraine will have problems at the level of the Council of Europe related not to the issue of media freedom, but to the situation of the Crimean Tatars.

A few steps back

The main stance taken by delegates to the Fourth session of the Third Kurultay, which in essence summed up the situation of the Crimean Tatar people throughout the 20th century, is that there is very great unhappiness with the situation in which the Crimean Tatars now find themselves in Crimea. It is no secret, and some delegates stated this in public, that recently, in spite of various measures taken by the Ukrainian state, the political, social and also the economic situation of the Crimean Tatars has worsened. They associate this with the policies of the communist-dominated Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, the activity of which often leads to an increase in tensions in the peninsula. According to an article in the journal “Qasevet” [“Sadness”], the authors of which conducted a survey among Crimean Tatars, 57.7 percent of the Crimean Tatar respondents mistrust the Crimean Verkhovna Rada, 58.3 percent mistrust the local authorities in the autonomy, and 45.2 percent mistrust the personnel responsible for ensuring law and order. Through the efforts of the authorities in the Crimean autonomy a constitution has been adopted for the autonomy, a constitution that does not foresee the representation of Crimean Tatars in the organs of authority and does not give their language the status of a state language in Crimea (as was the case earlier), the state authorities of the autonomy do not encourage the development of the Crimean Tatar community and culture, and these authorities provoke conflicts in the sphere of religion. Local administrative organs do not implement the instructions given by the President of Ukraine during his meetings with Crimean Tatars during his trips to the peninsula.

According to the present constitution neither the Russian nor the Crimean Tatar languages are recognized in the autonomy as state languages. In addition, the constitution does not foresee the representation of the formerly deported peoples in parliament (as was true of the previously convoked parliament) or, more concretely, the representation of Crimean Tatars, as the autochthonous population, in administrative structures. The new communist constitution of Crimea fails to guarantee both the appropriate level of education in national languages, and the development of culture in general. The Crimean Tatar people, who consider themselves, quite naturally, to be the only group with deep historical roots in the peninsula and, on top of that, consider themselves unjustly wronged are forced, in demanding their rights, to use not parliamentary methods, but actions of mass protest.

All this represents an enormous step backwards not only in comparison with the so-called “Meshkov” constitution (that is, the constitution that was adopted in 1994 when Meshkov was in power) but especially if one considers the situation of the Crimean Tatars in the autonomy in 1921. But in the referendum of January 20, 1991, when the population of Crimea supported the recreation of the Crimean ASSR, what they had in mind was specifically the autonomy that existed prior to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944; that is, in fact, a Crimean Tatar national-cultural autonomy. But there was not even a hint of the prior form of autonomy in the new autonomy that emerged- and even so this did not lead to an “explosion”. And what is more, there will be no explosion. Serious research has been conducted showing that artificial attempts to transform Crimea into a “Ukrainian Chechnya” will be unsuccessful (thank God!) although, of course, these attempts will spoil a lot of nerves in the process. For example, it is clear now that the attempt to completely “christen” Crimea; namely, to install a thousand “crosses of worship” on the island or, as some wits would put it, “a program of crosses instead of traffic lights’”, was inspired from abroad with the special aim of replacing unsuccessful attempts to provoke people into inter-ethnic conflicts with attempts to generate interconfessional conflicts. But this didn’t work. It wasn’t easy, but the Christian and Muslim communities of the village of Mors’ky have already reached an agreement and have peacefully resolved the situation. And they’ll find a way of managing things the next time around as well, no matter how hard individual bureaucrats try to pit people against each other... .

It is only natural that today’s Crimean Tatars, looking back at the period of 1921-1944, ask themselves: if Ukraine is a democratic country, then why do we not at least have that which we had prior to the war? The Kurultay, in addition to its resolutions on the land issue, and in addition to its appeals to the President, parliament and government of Ukraine, also approved a special resolution “On the situation of the Crimean Tatar people in connection with the policy of systematic discrimination applied to it in Crimea”. In this resolution it is stated that President Kuchma’s instructions, which he issued when he was in Yalta and Bakhchisaray, are not being implemented by local administrators, and that the local Crimean authorities are violating the country’s Constitution when, among other things, they ignore the needs of the Crimean Tatars. The resolution states that the “anti-Crimean Tatar policy implemented by the Crimean authorities has, during the last year, assumed the very brutal form of demonstrative contempt for the constitutional clauses stating that Ukraine is a law-based state, and emphasizing the equality of its citizens of all nationalities”. The resolution goes on to state that “open racists in the procuracy” make public statements in Nyzhn’ohirs’k about the need to deport the Crimean Tatars, in Bakhchisaray they “boast about their antisemitism”, and they cover up the police reign of terror in Saky. In the resolution it is stated that in Crimea a “new wave of repression against participants in the Crimean Tatar national movement is gaining force”. It is only logical to conclude, the resolution states, that by openly violating Ukraine’s Constitution the local Crimean authorities have transformed the Ukrainian state into a hostage of their anti-constitutional activities.

And although Ukraine is more-or-less doing what it can to deal with the economic problems faced by the Crimean Tatars, the resolution of political, social, cultural, and religious problems is being intentionally hampered by the Crimean authorities. And neither the President nor the parliament of Ukraine is taking steps to ensure that these authorities do not break the law. Thus it is not surprising that during their congress the Crimean Tatar delegates and their guests greatly stepped up their demands on Ukraine. In response to the harsh attacks on Ukraine Refat Chubarov said that the chauvinist forces outside Ukraine, whose attempts to exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions in Crimea were unsuccessful, have changed their policy and are emphasizing the exacerbation of interconfessional conflicts. Chubarov stated that “you shouldn’t be so quick to condemn Ukraine. You should differentiate among Ukraine’s politicians and political forces, and focus on the kind of Ukraine we would like to see- a Ukraine in which our rights would be restored”.

To be frank, the situation on the eve of the Kurultay was inflamed by a decision of the Dzhankoy district court which sentenced active participants in the Crimean Tatar national movement to two years of imprisonment (commuted) for organizing a protest involving the blockade of railroad tracks. At the same time, however, those who participated in the blockade of the railroad tracks in Nyzhn’ohirs’k district and those who blocked the streets in Simferopol (they were not Crimean Tatars) were not forced to account for their actions. Why? This question may have many answers, but the Crimean Tatars have come to one conclusion: a campaign of judicial persecution has been launched against their compatriots that does not apply to “extremists” of other nationalities. And this is happening in a democratic country?- they ask.

Repatriation: What awaits us in the 21st century?

Thus the 20th century represents a catastrophic turning point in the destiny of the Crimean Tatar people. According to scholars, after the liquidation of their statehood their numbers in Crimea fell from 3-4 million to approximately 200 thousand, all of whom were finally deported from the peninsula in 1944, a deportation that led to the death of 46.2 percent of the deportees during the first few years after they were exiled. Currently more than 250 thousand Crimean Tatars have returned to Crimea, and more than ten years have passed since they began to return in large numbers to their homeland in Ukraine. But Ukraine, although it declares itself to be a democratic country, has not managed to overcome the silent opposition of the Crimean authorities to the restoration of the rights of the peninsula’s autochthonous population. Laws have not been passed on the status of the Crimean Tatars, who clearly cannot reconcile themselves to simply bearing the status of a minority that has encountered discrimination and is not represented in the state institutions of its own homeland. The Crimean Tatar language, culture, and religion have not been revived, and the Crimean Tatars have no means of influencing decisions on issues of great importance to them unless they engage in mass protest actions. However, the participants in such actions, just as in the case of the Soviet empire, are being subjected to judicial persecution, and court sentences are now being pronounced against them “in the name of Ukraine”. If this situation continues then Ukraine will have its own dissidents, and “The Chronicle of Current Events” [the major underground dissident periodical of the Soviet period] and radio stations such as “Svoboda” [Radio Liberty], “the BBC”, “Voice of America”, “Deutsche Welle”, etc. will broadcast news about their trials to the entire world, just as in 1976 they gave publicity to the so-called Omsk trial against Mustafa Dzhemilev (see the book “The Russian Federation Against Mustafa Dzhemilev”). Does Ukraine want this to happen? Do the authorities in Kyiv want the 21st century to become a century of disgrace for their country with respect to the Crimean Tatar issue, just as the 20th century became a period of shame for the USSR?

As a special study has shown, as many as 88 thousand Crimean Tatars still remain in the regions to which they were deported in 1944, and 90 percent of them gave a positive answer when asked whether they would like to return to the homeland of their ancestors. Among the Crimean Tatars of Uzbekistan more than 9 thousand individuals have become citizens of Ukraine and will soon leave for our country. However, it is obvious that Ukraine is not yet prepared for this, since even in the case of those who are already in Ukraine an enormous number of problems remain unresolved. They include the absence of schools and employment opportunities, the poor state of the infrastructure in the villages where the Crimean Tatars settled in compact communities, and a slew of political problems. It was essential to provide funds to cover travel expenses and the immediate needs of resettlement, and Ukraine was proud that it provided such funds although all other countries of the region refused to participate in financing the repatriation of the former deportees. But it soon became clear that although this funding was important, it was far from what was really necessary. The funds that were initially assigned - the sum of approximately 300 million dollars - were insufficient given that the finances needed to cope with this problem were in the order of 3-4 billion dollars... .

Thus it is all the more shameful that the current disputes between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state concern issues that do not require extensive financing. For example, the earlier quota of 14 seats for the Crimean Tatars in Crimea’s parliament did not require additional expenditures but made it easier to handle certain difficult issues. It would have been so natural to extend this practice to the current parliamentary session- why could this not be done? Now it will be necessary to find some other means of ensuring a Crimean Tatar presence in future sessions of the parliament of Ukraine’s autonomy. An examination of the history of the previous Crimean parliament demonstrates that the “Kurultay” faction of deputies, consisting of Crimean Tatars, was characterized by a positive, responsible approach to its duties, and during this period of history it played a stabilizing role in promoting Ukraine’s statehood. At a time when there was, in essence, no pro-Ukraine lobby in the autonomy’s parliament (and in fact there is no such lobby there to the present day!), it was the “Kurultay” faction which fulfilled the role of a counterweight to pro-Russian tendencies, and “Meshkovite” as well as “RDK” extremism. In fact it always stood up for the state interests of Ukraine without any expectation that our country would, even in the future, appreciate the role it had played. It is quite bizarre, and illogical, that the Crimean Tatars have to fight to get their faction reinstated in Crimea’s parliament, which remains a pro-Russian enclave in Ukraine, while Ukraine’s officials reflect on whether this is really necessary. From another perspective, can such a large number of people (even if one treats the Crimean Tatars simply as a national minority, and not a fully-formed nation!), fail to have some form of representation in a representative (forgive me for this tautology!) body of government? If not legislation, then at least common sense should play a role here! Only Hrach’s incompetent communist regime could allow such a thing to happen....

Second, it is clear that sooner or later Crimea will return to a situation in which both the Crimean Tatar and, of course, the Russian languages will be recognized as state languages in the autonomy. Is it possible that this was not clear two years ago, when Crimea’s constitution was being approved? In the same fashion it has now become necessary to find ways of including Crimean Tatars in the process of parcelling out agricultural land on the peninsula, distributing property shares in the former Collective Agricultural Enterprises, ensuring their participation in the privatization process, etc. Didn’t the Crimean Tatars (in particular, the Medzhlis) continuously raise this issue from 1991 on?!? In many of the documents prepared by the Crimean Tatar movement (including the decisions of earlier Kurultays and even in a petition, to the President and all other administrative bodies in Ukraine, signed by 90 thousand Crimean Tatars!) it was clearly stated that, notwithstanding the various other problems faced by the Crimean Tatars, it was essential to create a land and property reserve that would take into account those Crimean Tatars who had not yet returned to Crimea. It was precisely this kind of measure that would have ensured that the return of the Crimean Tatars occur in a systematic fashion. Planning of this kind was a frequent topic of discussion on the part of the authorities in Crimea, who drew a contrast between such planning and the supposedly spontaneous way in which the Crimean Tatars actually returned to Crimea. However, it soon became clear that all this talk of planning, and talk of many other things as well, was just that- talk and nothing else. Today, when many problems- of a political, cultural, and religious nature, as well as issues related to property rights - have become exacerbated and will increase in importance as even more repatriates return to Crimea - both the Crimean authorities and, what is even more shameful, the Ukrainian authorities as well, have shown how confused they really are. Every day they demonstrate how unprepared they are to understand the current situation, and attempt to simply hide from reality, even though it is increasingly obvious that they can’t continue along this path. But if the Crimean Tatars themselves could predict the emergence of these problems, how is it that the authorities could not foresee them?

The specific feature of the present situation is that it is no longer enough to simply talk about these issues. It is necessary to work to resolve them- to create the conditions, which will allow the repatriates to feel themselves secure, and remember that we are talking about hundreds of thousands of repatriates! And to achieve this one doesn’t need a great deal: it is only necessary for the Crimean Tatars and the state to communicate with each other, and it doesn’t matter whether it is in the Ukrainian, Russian or Crimean Tatar languages. The main thing is to understand one another. It is often said that progress begins from the moment of understanding. I am certain that this will be the case here as well, and that only then will it be possible to look boldly to the 21st century... .

Offices that grow ever fatter - these are the concrete results of autonomy...

The Crimean Council of Ministers recently examined the draft budget of the autonomous republic for the year 2001. For the first time, as a result of government efforts, this process was very open and public: beforehand a Coordination Council, consisting of representatives of the regions, was created, normative deductions were devised, and before the draft was presented for consideration by the government it was discussed, on several occasions, with ministries, agencies, and the public. During the current year Crimea’s financial balance was elaborated more carefully than during the previous year. Nonetheless, in spite of the great openness which accompanied the government’s discussions of this central financial document, a number of strange paradoxes emerged that throw into sharp relief the essence of today’s Crimean autonomy.

For example, the head of the Committee on Housing and Communal Services, Yevhen Namiak, could not help but be incensed by the fact that in 1997 the proportion of funding received by these services was 7.1 percent of the republican budget, while in 2001 this percentage had dropped to 4.1 percent. What is more, the development of housing and communal services in Crimea had reached a deadlock: on the one hand the communist faction in theVerkhovna Rada did not approve of a growth in tariffs for communal services, and on the other hand funding for these services was reduced. And thus in addition to a series of other debts, the salary debt alone owed to those working in the sphere of communal services consists of 11 million hryvnyas. At the same time it became clear that two years ago the finances required for the work of Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada amounted to more than 4 million hryvnyas, and this sum has now grown to almost 8 million hryvnyas. For example, last year the budget of Crimea’s Auditing Office amounted to 40 thousand hryvnyas, and for this year it has requested funding in the amount of almost 800 thousand hryvnyas. Those working for this office were very unhappy that the draft budget foresaw spending of only 460 thousand hryvnyas for their services. Thus we can see that the financing of this office grew by more than a factor of 11! And it should be noted that the handsome wages paid to auditors (which, by the way, are to be increased by 25 percent this year!) are paid promptly, on schedule, not with the delays that one finds in the case of those working in the communal services sector. So we can see for what purpose budget funds are not spared- who cares about communal services!?

It soon became clear that the Verkhovna Rada had tried to conceal the estimates of planned expenses for 2001 by presenting them on the very last day, and even this was done only on the demand of the government’s Coordinating Council on budget formulation. And in previous years the Verkhovna Rada’s budget had been formulated very simply - on the basis of telephone conversations! At present, according to Anatoliy Korniychuk, the representative of the President in Crimea, the cost of employing an individual in his office is only 15 thousand hryvyas, while the predicted cost of employing an individual in the apparatus of the Council of Ministers of Crimea is 28 thousand hryvnyas, and of employing an individual working for Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada - 47 thousand hryvnyas. Thus the apparatchiks of the provincial Crimean parliament are paid salaries that are three time greater than the salaries of those working in the Presidential Administration. So it is only natural that they are keen on celebrating the 10th anniversary of this referendum. For example, according to data contained in the “Analysis of expenditures for the maintenance of legislative bodies” published in Crimea, in 1995 126 individuals worked in the apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada. To service the needs of the 58 deputies who worked on a professional basis required 1,917.1 thousand hryvnyas. But in the year 2000 the number of those in the apparatus of the Crimean parliament had grown to 341, and they, serving the needs of no more than 15 deputies who were working on a professional basis, were responsible for expenditures of 7,027.0 thousand hryvnyas. And it cannot be said that the effectiveness of the work of Crimea’s parliament during these years had grown. On the contrary, the work of the parliament is focussed exclusively on a scandalous dispute with the government. The situation degenerated to the point that the January session of parliament could not take place because the parliamentary chairman, Leonid Hrach, could not find a common language with the factions in parliament. Why should the residents of Crimea, following the creation of the autonomy, be forced to provide ever-growing sums of money to support deputies who are not doing anything useful? What is more, why should they support a body whose activities consistently are aimed at exacerbating the situation of and relations among various groups in the autonomy, at creating conflicts where none had existed earlier? And all this is occurring in spite of the forceful demands of Ukraine’s President and Council of Ministers that administrative reforms must be carried out and the bureaucratic apparatus must be cut back.... .

As Crimea’s Minister of Finances, Liudmyla Denysova, informs us, in the budget for the expenses of Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada, in addition to 4.6 million hryvnyas for the maintenance of its apparatus, it is predicted that 2.3 million hryvnyas will be needed to support the work of deputies, 200 thousand will be needed to finance the organs of local self-government, and 460 thousand hryvnyas will be needed to finance the Auditing Office. And you should note that all these sections of the budget also contain clauses on the acquisition of basic elements of infrastructure: various instruments, furniture, and other kinds of equipment which, as Anatoliy Korniychuk noted, contravenes the President’s decree on reducing the purchases of items for the use of bureaucrats. In addition, as noted by a deputy head of the government, deputy of Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada Vasyl’ Kyselyov, as many as 15 organizations rent space in the building of Crimea’s Verkhovna Rada. The rental fees they pay are used without controls and are supplementary to the regular financing obtained through the budget.

All this is occurring at a time when ministers analyzing the budget can come up with an enormous number of items in the republic’s budget which are funded at ridiculously low levels. For example, there is no provision for funds to complete the process of agrarian reform on the peninsula although many Crimean Tatars have not received any land at all, and insufficient funds are allocated for health services. In particular, deputy head of the government Serhiy Velizhanskyy has requested that no less than 3 million hryvnyas be allocated for the renovation of severely neglected buildings belonging to the communal sector of the health care system. Another deputy head of the government, Oleksandr Ryabkov, has demanded 1.6 million hryvnyas so that the residents of the heavily damaged building located in the Mariyins’kyi landslide zone can be moved out; their lives would be threatened if they continued to live in this building. The Minister of Resorts, Oleksandr Taryanyk, has requested that no less than 1 million hryvnyas be allocated for the creation of specialized sites on the internet advertising Crimea’s resorts. This need has emerged since Russia has begun an intensive program of “internetizing” the Sochi resort zone. Other priorities that could be mentioned include the wage debt owed to teachers as well as the need to improve the financing of the procuracy and the internal affairs organs.

In a word there are more than enough financial “holes” in the autonomy apart from those related to the Crimean Tatar problem. It is only in the corridors of power that one does not find financial problems. But this is not surprising, for they are masters of their own fortune. Thus the bureaucracy is growing fat. In the opinion of many residents of Crimea this, in fact, is the main conclusion to be drawn from the restoration of Crimea’s territorial autonomy.

¹According to our reckon this is the 5th constitution.