MULTICULTURAL RHETORIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES: CANADA AND CRIMEA

In the year 2000 CIDA (the Canadian International Development Agency) sponsored the visits (“study tours”) to Canada of two delegations from Ukraine. The purpose of these study tours was to allow members of the delegations to study various aspects of the Canadian experience of managing ethnocultural diversity, in the hope that some aspects of this experience can be applied to Crimea (formally, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). Crimea is, of course, the region of Ukraine facing the greatest challenges in dealing with the diversity of its population and, in particular, the pressing needs of the quarter-million Crimean Tatars who have returned to since the late 1980s.

It is difficult to evaluate the benefits of such study tours. A great deal depends on the composition of the delegations, the quality of the program prepared for the delegations, and the willingness of both visitors and hosts to openly and honestly address issues that are often painful and controversial. However, even in the best of circumstances it is difficult for the members of such delegations to quickly gain insights into the numerous factors and various nuances that shape government policies designed to help manage ethnic diversity in a country such as Canada. In particular, it is easy to lose sight of the way in which such policies are shaped not only by historical traditions, demographic realities, and the popularity of liberal-democratic values, but also by very pragmatic political considerations. A realistic evaluation of government policies in the sensitive sphere of managing ethnic diversity therefore calls for great sensitivity to the political realities that shape these policies, and great caution in assessing the often emotional rhetoric that is used by both critics and proponents of such policies.

In December 2000, during a seminar held in Ottawa in connection with one of the above-mentioned study tours, I was asked to address the following question: how useful is the Canadian experience in helping to prepare a strategic plan for managing Crimea’s ethnocultural diversity? The text below represents an expanded and modified version of my presentation at this seminar.

Canada’s experience with managing ethnic diversity is not particularly useful if one is looking for simple analogies that will provide easy and straightforward answers to the complicated questions that emerge when one examines the current ethnopolitical situation in Crimea. The Canadian experience is important not because it provides a comprehensive and successful blueprint for addressing the challenges of ethnocultural diversity, but because it might provide outside observers, including those from Ukraine, with insights that will help them to address the problems that they face, in their specific circumstances, in a creative but also realistic manner.

One of the purposes of this seminar is to prepare proposals, based partly on the Canadian experience, for ways of better dealing with the diversity of Crimea’s population. Thus it is important to inquire whether Canada itself now has, or in fact has ever had, a coherent and comprehensive strategy to manage its ethnocultural diversity. One can argue that there was a certain attempt in the late 1960s and 1970s, inspired to a large extent by the late Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, to devise such a strategy. Important components of this strategy included the announcement of official policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism, firm opposition to recognizing the distinct status of Quebec in the Canadian federation, and a controversial White Paper on Indian Policy (the fully and formal title was “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy”, 1969) that essentially advocated the full integration and assimilation of Canada’s native peoples. However, thirty years later, the Canadian reality is very different from what Trudeau and his supporters envisaged.

The Canadian experience of managing ethnic diversity raises a number of important and provocative questions. For example, why, in spite of the enormous efforts that have been devoted to dealing with the threat of Quebec’s possible separation from the rest of Canada, does this threat periodically re-emerge on the Canadian political scene and generate such passionate debates in Canadian politics? Why did it take Canada so long to address the question of compensating Japanese Canadians for the way in which they were treated (deported into the interior of Canada) during World War II? Why do the official federal government policies of French-English bilingualism and multiculturalism continueto generate so many heated debates in Canada, and why has the provincial government of Quebec consistently rejected the federal government’s multiculturalism policy? Many other questions along these lines could be raised.

What happened to dispel the optimism of the late 1960s? The answer is simple - the grandiose ideals of large-scale strategic planning favoured by Prime Minister Trudeau and many of his advisors, designed to reshape many fundamental aspects of Canadian society, came into conflict with certain basic political realities. For example, in the late 1960s there was no clear and widely-supported public or elite consensus on the nature and extent of bilingualism appropriate for Canada, and this has not changed; the official multiculturalism policy announced in 1971 was regarded, by a majority of Quebec’s senior politicians, of all political stripes, as an attempt to diminish the role of French Canadians as one of the two “founding peoples” of Canada; Canada’s native peoples vigorously rejected the assumptions of the White Paper on Indian Policy; etc. In short, the ambitious “master plan” for managing ethnocultural diversity that was originally advocated by some federal politicians in the 1960s and 1970s soon became bogged down in the process of negotiating compromises among a variety of political actors and social groups. These were often rather “messy” compromises that could not be easily accommodated by Trudeau’s “master plan” and offended his logical, Cartesian mindset. The process of bargaining that led to these compromises was intensely political, leading to heated debates that continue to the present day. However, it is precisely this bargaining process, involving entire “armies” of federal and provincial officials involved in never-ending bureaucratic “battles” and the lobbying efforts of numerous non-governmental actors that have helped to ensure the sometimes shaky but nonetheless peaceful stability of inter-ethnic relations in Canada.

When one examines the actual record of Canada’s federal and provincial authorities in managing ethnic diversity, it is clear that they have been quite flexible in their interpretations of official government policies. For example, they have often acted in a pragmatic fashion to implement policies that have differentiated significantly among some of Canada’s ethnocultural communities, taking into account factors such as the historical development of these communities; their location, size, and distribution; the competence and lobbying skills of community leaders; etc. In particular, government policies have been significantly shaped by a very significant reality - that Canada’s ethnic communities differ a great deal in the extent to which they desire to maintain their languages and cultures and to ensure their existence as organized communities. This has clearly influenced the way in which various ethnic groups were and are perceived and treated by various governmental actors.

This should not be considered a criticism of Canada’s multiculturalism policy. It does not diminish the fact that a considerable effort is made in Canada to ensure that the basic human rights of all of its citizens are observed regardless of their ethnic background. The goal of ensuring the individual human rights of the members of all ethnic groups in Canada is a fundamental precept of Canada’s multiculturalism policy. However, one also finds that Canada’s federal and provincial authorities, in addition to attempting to ensure these basic human rights also recognize, de facto and sometimes de jure, a variety of different group rights for various categories of its citizens such as indigenous peoples, official-language minorities, and certain religious groups. This situation is further complicated by the fact that Canada’s provinces have jurisdiction over many of the policy areas (e.g., education and culture) that are of very great importance to those interested in maintaining viable ethnic communities.

In spite of these complexities, Canada’s efforts to manage the country’s ethnic diversity have generally been quite successful. It has even been argued that Canada’s multicultural “model” should be applied to other regions of the world. However, one should be very cautious in arguing for the applicability of Canada’s experience to other settings. A number of factors help to explain why Canada’s record in this sphere has been so successful.

1. A considerable volume of funding is devoted to maintaining a stable system of inter-ethnic relations in Canada, although critics of official multiculturalism/bilingualism policies often exaggerate the extent of this funding. This includes funds to support instruction in Canada’s two official languages, fight racism, encourage greater cultural sensitivity on the part of those (such as the members of police forces) who have extensive contacts with the members of various ethnic communities, etc.

2. Large “armies” of government bureaucrats, lawyers, and representatives of community groups are frequently involved in numerous meetings, conferences, negotiating sessions, etc. to discuss and deal with a wide range of issues of concern to Canada’s various ethnic communities. At such events considerable attention is often devoted to the way in which other countries have dealt with similar issues.

3. In Canada the rule of law is generally observed and the judicial system usually operates, fairly effectively, to mediate the various disputes that inevitably emerge in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.

4. In Canada a spirit of tolerance and a willingness to engage in complex compromises is widespread in the broader public sphere as well as in the political arena. These compromises almost always fail to fully satisfy any of those involved in debates over often emotional and highly contentious issues related to ethnocultural diversity. Nonetheless, they often help to defuse potentially stressful and even dangerous situations.

5. The mass media in Canada devote considerable attention to cases of discrimination against minorities, including ethnic minorities, and play an important role in publicizing the grievances of such minorities.

6. With the exception of Canada’s “founding” (Anglo-Saxon and French) ethnic groups, and the country’s indigenous populations, ethnic minorities in Canada are not territorially concentrated and generally do not demonstrate a strong, long-term commitment to the maintenance of a distinctive language and culture. Some communities with a strong religious tradition (e.g., religious Jews, Old-Order Mennonites) are a partial exception to this rule, and even they face strong assimilatory pressures.

Those in Ukraine, and Crimea in particular, who are involved in debates on managing ethnocultural diversity, operate in an environment that is much more stressful than the environment in Canada, and this greatly hampers their efforts.

1. Very limited funds are available to even begin to address many of the needs and problems faced by ethnic minorities and, in particular, the formerly deported Crimean Tatars. In addition, the limited funding that has been allocated to assist ethnic minorities has often been used in an inefficient and sometimes totally inappropriate fashion.

2. Few government officials in Ukraine, and specifically Crimea, have any substantial experience of dealing with the challenges posed by ethnic diversity and issues such as the resettlement of former deportees. Few have shown a strong interest in how other countries have managed ethnic diversity.

3. The rule of law operates in a very imperfect way in Ukraine (many observers would regard this as an understatement). Various figures of authority in Ukraine have taken advantage of weaknesses or inconsistencies in the country’s legislation or legal system to ignore or downplay the legitimate concerns of various social groups, including ethnic minorities.

4. A great deal of intolerance, and an unwillingness to engage in negotiations that would lead to reasonable compromises to accommodate ethnic diversity, can be found in some sectors of Ukrainian society. This includes numerous politicians, government officials, and community figures in Crimea.

5. Ukraine’s mass media have devoted relatively little attention to portraying the situation and grievances of the country’s ethnic minorities. In Crimea the mainstream mass media sometimes encourage rather than discourage intolerance and xenophobia, with Crimean Tatars being regularly subjected to vicious stereotyping and used as scapegoats for many of Crimea’s socio-economic and political problems.

6. Most of the major ethnic minorities in Ukraine are territorially concentrated in certain regions, and in the case of minorities such as the Romanians (Bukovyna), Hungarians (Zakarpattya), and Crimean Tatars, have deep historical roots in the territories where they reside. These historically rooted communities have generally demonstrated a strong desire to maintain their language and culture.

Given the difficult circumstances that prevail in Ukraine and, in particular, Crimea, it is not surprising that one finds ethnic tensions and widespread grievances among the Crimean Tatars. What is surprising is that these tensions and grievances have not, to date, found a more violent expression. In fact, in the early 1990s a United Nations official from Canada noted that the relative absence of inter-ethnic violence in Crimea has made it easy for Ukraine and the international community to downplay the importance of the problems facing Crimea.

One can, of course, find extremists in the Crimean Tatar community, and the actions of some Crimean Tatar activists do not always fall fully within the framework of the formal rule of law in Ukraine. However, the presence of some extremists is not surprising, since every ethnic community has its share of individuals with extreme views. Rather, what is surprising is the relatively small number of such extremists among the Crimean Tatars given the circumstances in Crimea. In short, these circumstances are such that the legislative, administrative, and legal institutions operating in this region (and Ukraine as a whole) have often failed to address many of the legitimate grievances of the Crimean Tatars who have returned to their homeland, and to satisfy some of their most elementary needs such as employment and education opportunities, access to decent health care facilities, etc.

In view of this situation it should be clear that there are no easy “recipes” for maintaining calm, stable inter-ethnic relations in the setting of Crimea. It is therefore disappointing to note that a simplistic and naive (or may be cynical) view of multiculturalism has been popularized in Crimea. In particular, representatives of the majority Russian population in Crimea, as well as the representatives of some small but politically influential ethnic communities, have often used the rhetoric of multiculturalism to support the argument that no ethnic group(s) in Crimea should be provided with special rights or privileges (the Crimean Tatars are usually the main “targets” of this rhetoric). However, the consequences of such a simplistic use of multicultural rhetoric become clear if one adopts a realistic rather than idealistic perspective on Canada’s multiculturalism policy.

Such a realistic perspective would acknowledge that Canada’s multiculturalism policy has made a great contribution to combating ethnic/racial discrimination and stereotypes, and promoting the essential equality, in most spheres, of all of Canada’s citizens whatever their ethnic/racial background. However, at the same time those implementing this policy have provided almost no support to Canada’s ethnic groups to maintain and develop the kind of infrastructure (in the areas of education, the mass media, etc.) that is essential if these groups are to exist as viable ethnic minority communities, over the long run, in Canada. One should immediately note that those behind the declaration of Canada’s multiculturalism policy never claimed that it would or should provide such support. In addition, most of the leaders and members of Canada’s immigrant ethnic groups never realistically expected much support of this kind. Still, in the absence of such support multiculturalism can, quite realistically, be perceived as essentially encouraging a humane and relatively painless form of cultural assimilation into anglophone or francophone society. The validity of this perception is underlined by a large body of evidence indicating that, in spite of the rhetoric that was often used to contrast Canada’s multicultural “mosaic” to the assimilationist “melting pot” of the United States, sociological trends (integration and assimilation) among most ethnic minorities in these two countries are very similar.

Here it is also important to note that, even in Canada, multicultural rhetoric has sometimes been used to support a certain political agenda. For example, one of the factors that helps explain the introduction of Canada’s multiculturalism policy in 1971 was the expectation, on the part of then Prime Minister Trudeau and some of his associates, that this policy would emphasize the importance of a pluralist perspective on Canada’s history and political system. Such a perspective would help draw attention away from the dualist perspective, heavily favoured by the leaders of Canada’s francophone community that stressed the importance of Canada’s two “founding peoples” and Quebec’s special, distinctive role in upholding the interests of its francophone population.

The political agenda that can lie behind the rhetoric of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism is especially obvious when one examines the way in which this rhetoric is employed in Crimea. On the surface this rhetoric appears harmless. It is widely used in various publications, and is found in many of the resolutions that emerge from various seminars, conferences and round-table discussions (usually funded from abroad) on this topic. Here the following ritual phrases are repeated over and over: inter-cultural understanding, harmony, and cooperation; the equality of all ethnocultural communities; the benefits of ethnocultural diversity; the importance of fighting ethnic/racial stereotypes; etc. However, what these noble but rather cliched terms downplay, and often ignore, are some very basic and important political realities in Crimea.

One of these realities is that the attractive rhetoric of cultural pluralism is often used by politicians and officials who have consistently opposed granting any special consideration to the Crimean Tatars, a community with a very distinctive relationship with Crimea and that was by far the most important target of the brutal deportations from Crimea in 1944. These politicians and officials, who represent (or claim to represent) the majority Russian population of Crimea, as well as Russified minorities or those (e.g., Armenians) who share the interests of this majority community, find it convenient to use such rhetoric since it does not pose any challenge to the present status quo on the Crimean peninsula. This status quo, it should be emphasized, was the result of policies which, from 1944 until the late 1980s, led to the elimination of almost all traces of the Crimean Tatar presence in Crimea (the main exceptions were a few isolated tourist attractions such as the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray). At the same time, all possible efforts were made to ensure that a comprehensive and well-developed infrastructure was in place to satisfy the educational/cultural needs of ’s majority population of ethnic Russians, the great majority of whom arrived in Crimea in the wake of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars.

Given the legacy of these policies, and the great hostility with which the defenders of this status quo greeted the return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea, the rhetoric of cultural pluralism cannot help but generate cynicism in the Crimean Tatar community. Their representatives are quite justified in emphasizing the assimilationist bias of this rhetoric, for those who voice it have often shown, by their actions, that they are in favour of a very specific variety of cultural pluralism. It would allow, for example, the Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, Greeks and others in Crimea to sing and dance to their heart’s content, and cultivate their native cuisine, especially if this helps to attract and entertain foreign tourists. It would allow minority representatives to endlessly discuss their grievances in various conferences, consultative councils or meetings, and round-table discussions, especially if such events are funded by outside sources and provide Crimea’s politicians and bureaucrats with a veneer of respectability among foreign observers. In short, the unspoken logic of the mainstream rhetoric of cultural pluralism in Crimea is clear. According to this logic it would be best for everyone concerned if the peninsula’s ethnic minorities, and especially the Crimean Tatars, abandon any distinctive political demands. They should be encouraged to maintain their colourful folklore and other surface manifestations of ethnicity. However, over time, they should peacefully merge with Crimea’s majority population of Russian ethnic background.

Thus in the context of Crimea the rhetoric of cultural pluralism misleads rather than informs by implying that the interests of all ethnic communities in Crimea are similar or even identical. In the case of the Crimean Tatars, it should be stressed that they returned to Crimea not to serve as a tourist attraction, but in order to preserve their language and culture and ensure the further long-term development of a viable and flourishing Crimean Tatar community. Achieving the construction of the infrastructure for such a community will be the result of a difficult process of bargaining, compromise, and negotiation. This will be an intensely political process, involving considerable disruption in the current status quo, and the success of the process will largely depend on who speaks for and represents the interests of the Crimean Tatars.

For those who study ethnopolitics it is clear that those who claim to speak on behalf of a particular ethnic community only rarely truly represent the group’s genuine best interests. It should also be obvious that no ethnic group, including the Crimean Tatars, is monolithic. Thus it is deceptively easy to argue that institutions such as the Crimean Tatar Kurultay and Mejlis do not, and cannot, infallibly speak for all Crimean Tatars. However, one should be careful not to set an impossibly high standard of behaviour for assessing such institutions that no ethnic group, whatever the circumstances, could ever be expected to achieve.

Only a biased observer could fail to observe that the Crimean Tatar community has achieved a remarkably high level of self-organization and political mobilization. This is not to deny the differences that have emerged within this community. However, it is very difficult to find other examples of ethnic groups that have maintained, over a long period of time, such a high level of effective mobilization outside of wartime circumstances. Given its role in achieving and maintaining this mobilization, the Mejlis and its leaders can genuinely claim to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatar community in a very substantial and meaningful way. This has been demonstrated, time and time again, since the revival of organized political activity among the Crimean Tatars following their return to Crimea. I am much more skeptical about those who claim to speak on behalf of the Russian, Ukrainian, and other ethnic communities in Crimea. It is thus very unwise to ignore or minimize the importance of these institutions during debates on Crimea’s future. This is not to say that the views of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar community will necessarily prevail in such discussions. However, it would be very dangerous to fail to involve these leaders, in a very substantial way, in these debates.

In conclusion, looking at various models of inter-ethnic relations, including Canada’s multicultural model, and developing strategies to encourage positive inter-group relations, can be a useful and thought-provoking exercise. However, such an exercise has to be based on a very good understanding of the political realities of a given situation. Otherwise even hundreds of foreign delegations, exchange programs, and round-table discussions, as well as noble talk of multicultural ideals, will fail to make a significant contribution to peace and stability in Crimea.